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Towards a New Compact for University Education in Ontario
Abstract
Over the past decade, a number of different industrialized democracies have critically examined the structure
and performance of their postsecondary education systems. By and large, the focus of this attention has been
on the capacity of the state to support the needs and aspirations of the traditional publicly funded research-
intensive university. In the received model, the public research university receives significant levels of funding
from the state to support its research and teaching activities, but is subject to some level of state oversight and
control so as to render the activities of the institution congruent with the public interest. The level of state
intervention in the affairs of the public research university (and its precise form) varies of course from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but typically involves some regulation of programs (priority may be placed on
education and research programs that are geared to the local economy), tuition fees (typically set at below
market rates), student financial assistance, and admissions (preferential treatment for in-state versus out-of-
state or out-of-country students). In contrast, privately funded research universities (to the extent that they
are permitted to operate in jurisdictions supporting public university education) are not subject to the same
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Towards a New Compact in
University Education in Ontario
RONALD J. DANIELS AND MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK*
Over the past decade, a number of different industrialized democracies
have critically examined the structure and performance of their post-
secondary education systems. By and large, the focus of this attention
has been on the capacity of the state to support the needs and aspira-
tions of the traditional publicly funded research-intensive university. In
the received model, the public research university receives significant
levels of funding from the state to support its research and teaching
activities, but is subject to some level of state oversight and control so as
to render the activities of the institution congruent with the public
interest. The level of state intervention in the affairs of the public re-
search university (and its precise form) varies of course from jurisdic-
tion to jurisdiction, but typically involves some regulation of programs
(priority may be placed on education and research programs that are
geared to the local economy), tuition fees (typically set at below market
rates), student financial assistance, and admissions (preferential treat-
ment for in-state versus out-of-state or out-of-country students). In
contrast, privately funded research universities (to the extent that they
are permitted to operate in jurisdictions supporting public university
education) are not subject to the same degree of oversight, but also do
not receive the same degree of public funding.1
Concerns over the capacity of the publicly funded research university
to respond to social needs emanates from a number of different sources.
First, given the significant private benefits that are conferred on univer-
sity graduates (in terms of both their increased social status and en-
hanced earning power), there is concern over the ability of the publicly
funded university system to accommodate the burgeoning interest of
students (and their families) in obtaining higher education. In a setting
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where publicly funded universities enjoy a statutory monopoly on the
provision of university education, and assuming that the quality of
existing programs is to be held constant, any expansion in university
enrollment necessarily requires either an increase in the level of state
support for the system and/or relaxation of some of the tuition con-
straints set by government so that students end up bearing more of the
costs of their education relative to the benefits received. Second, con-
cern over capacity constraints in the public university system may also
lead the state to consider the scope for entry by private institutions,
which in tum raises questions of the appropriate scope for governmen-
tal financial support and regulation. Third, another concern is the grow-
ing competitive threat posed by elite private universities (particularly
in the United States) for the very best students and faculty. To the extent
that publicly funded research universities lack the resources or flexibil-
ity to attract and retain outstanding faculty and students, the quality of
their institutional performance will suffer accordingly. Not surpris-
ingly, the intensity of the threat posed by well-funded private universi-
ties to the publicly funded university has spawned a debate over the
suitability of relaxing certain constraints that govern the affairs of the
public university system.
In much of our scholarly or government advisory work on public
policy issues in the past, we have emphasized the importance of the
appropriate choice of instrument in vindicating widely-shared public
policy goals. In the context of post-secondary education, it is at least as
important to be clear on the goals or ends of post-secondary education
and then to evaluate whether a superior choice of instrument or means
is available than policies presently exhibit to more fully vindicate these
goals or ends. Thus, we first examine the desired ends of higher educa-
tion. We then discuss the various rationales for government interven-
tion. Next we proceed to explore in greater depth the various criticisms
and problems of the present instruments governing publicly funded
research-intensive universities throughout the industrialized democra-
cies. We then focus specifically on problems facing the Ontario post-
secondary sector. Finally, we propose modifications to the current Ontario
model designed to increase the level of public and private revenue for
public universities which in our view would enhance international
standards of excellence in teaching and research while enhancing
student equality of opportunity - modifications that in our view will
provide a better fit of goals and instruments (ends and means).
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1. The Ends of Post-Secondary Education and the
Rationales for Government Intervention
There are two quite different but complementary enterprises that moti-
vate the existence of post-secondary institutions.2 The first is a teaching
or educational mandate. As with primary and secondary education,
this educational mandate can be understood as having two motiva-
tions. The first motivation is that of instilling in students the skills and
knowledge that are required to engage in a specific profession or voca-
tion. University professional programs - medicine, dentistry, pharmacy,
nursing, law, management, and engineering - fall squarely into this
'skills' portion of the educational mandate. These programs confer
substantial private benefits on students in the form of increased human
capital. Riddell, for instance, has found most estimates place 'average
real rates of return to post-secondary education at 6-9% for men and
8-10% for women, although there are substantial differences across
fields of study.'3 The second aim of the teaching mandate is to enable
students to mature into effective citizens - fully capable participants in
a culturally rich, diverse, democratic society. The fulfillment of this aim
is largely the domain of undergraduate arts programmes and advanced
liberal arts graduate programmes, although to some extent all pro-
grams contribute to this end. The second enterprise that motivates the
existence of post-secondary institutions is the pursuit and amplification
of knowledge through rigorous scholarly research. Such research can be
conducted at either a basic or applied level (or, typically, at both levels),
and confers significant benefits on humankind in the form of new
understandings of the human condition and the physical environment.4
In the research-intensive university, neither of these activities can be
said to take precedence over the other. Its teaching and research mis-
sions fortify and complement one another, and account for its distinc-
tive strengths and longevity.
Given this time-honoured role of the research-intensive university,
what is the rationale for government intervention in this area? There are
three main rationales that to varying degrees support public involve-
ment in post-secondary education. First, the positive externalities asso-
ciated with post-secondary education, emanating from the civic virtue
and citizenship values that are nurtured in students, ground a case for
public subsidization. So, too, do the positive externalities associated
with various types of research activities. Second, there may be a weak
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paternalism role for government insofar as students may suffer from
informational deficiencies when determining which program of study
to pursue at which institution. Third, given the human-capital market
limitations that constrain private capital available to students, there is a
strong case for government intervention based on equality of opportu-
nity goals.
Positive Externalities
Markets fail to reach efficient outcomes when decision-makers do not
experience the full consequences - that is, bear all the costs and reap all
the benefits - of their actions. Therefore, a case for government subsidi-
zation in the market for post-secondary education is made out to the
extent that a significant portion of the benefits of post-secondary educa-
tion - an enhanced civic culture, valuable research breakthroughs, and
increased community cohesion - accrue to the public good and not to
individual decision-makers alone (Le. potential students). It makes in-
tuitive economic sense to argue that the government should subsidize
the cost of post-secondary education to the extent that society at large
reaps the benefits, and because they are likely to be sub-optimally
supplied. Concomitantly, individual students should pay the costs of
post-secondary education to the extent that they individually reap the
private benefits of their post-secondary education. If such a system
operated in a world of perfect information and rationality, a socially
optimal level of post-secondary education would be 'produced' and
'consumed' in the marketplace.6
Although drawing this dichotomy in the benefits of post-secondary
education is overly simplistic and fraught with measurement difficul-
ties, it has utility as a framing idea. Consider the fact that typically post-
secondary education that increases a student's future income7 will
increase societal wealth and, derivatively, government tax revenue,
thereby providing concrete benefits to society.8 In this way, even the
most skills-oriented program is likely to generate social benefits. How-
ever, the intangible positive externalities - the creation of a robust civic
culture and increased community cohesion - associated with post-
secondary education in the arts and professions are probably at least as
valuable in the long run as these indirect fiscal dividends.9 In any event,
using the public/private benefit dichotomy we have a prima facie case
for government intervention in post-secondary education to the extent
that mixed private and public funding is required to match the costs of
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post-secondary education with those garnering the benefits flowing
there from.
Another related rationale for public intervention in relation to post-
secondary education concerns the university's research activities. Be-
cause basic (and even applied) research has the character of a public
good (its benefits are appropriable by all), it will be under-supplied by
the market; as a consequence, there is a role for government in subsidiz-
ing the production of research. Absent this supplementary funding, it is
highly unlikely that private parties will dedicate a socially optimal
amount of their own resources to research if they will not be able to reap
the full range of benefits.l° In the last decade or so, considerable atten-
tion has been devoted to the role played by research-intensive univer-
sities in spawning industrial innovation. In light of this recognition,
governments in a number of jurisdictions have increased the level of
public funding keyed to both basic and applied research.ll Riddell
contends that the social benefits of post-secondary education are sub-
stantial and may, in fact, approximate the private returns (7-10%).12
Paternalism
Participation in post-secondary education, unlike participation in pri-
mary and secondary education, is not mandatory but optional. Accord-
ingly, One can assume that each individual is making a rational choice
to acquire a set of skills or form of learning that will be of significant
personal value to them upon graduation. In these terms, government
should be understandably wary of exercising a paternalistic role in
shaping choices in relation to post-secondary education, because the
choice of one's vocation is central to one's mode of life and thus to one's
very sense of self-fulfillment. Moreover, given that nearly all potential
post-secondary students will have already completed twelve years of
formal education before making these choices, they should be regarded
as being capable of making rational and informed decisions regarding
the appropriate future course of their education.
There may be some modest scope for government intervention
grounded on paternalism rationales in the form of a government-
mandated disclosure system that would seek to attenuate information
asymmetries existing between students and post-secondary institutions,
although it is not clear that students themselves are incapable of recog-
nizing the existence of these asymmetries and securing privately pro-
duced information (in the form of rankings, university evaluations) that
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would assist them in making informed choices. Government-mandated
disclosure would require institutions receiving public funds to publish
information respecting the quality of the entering class, the quality and
character of the academic program (course offerings, class sizes, fac-
ulty/ student ratios), student completion rates, faculty research activity,
and career placement patterns for graduates.
Equality of Opportunity
Although post-secondary education should not be considered a right
available to all citizens irrespective of individual merit, true equality of
opportunity among equally meritorious citizens (however one defines
meritorious in this context) is a benefit of considerable importance.
Professional schools playa pivotal 'gatekeeper' role in determining
access to the corridors of power within a democratic system.B The
representation of various communities in positions of power and in the
professions must be of concern. Thus, we should take seriously the
broader social consequences of admissions policies in such institutions.
However, given the current competitive landscape, and the role of
various legal restrictions on discriminatory admissions practices, most
universities are committed to recruiting the strongest possible student
body, and thus the admissions decision is typically merit driven. The
difficulty, however, arises in relation to the capacity of the admitted
student to afford the prescribed tuition levels, particularly when limita-
tions in human capital markets constrain the capacity of meritorious
students to borrow to finance their education against the collateral of
their human capital. Consequently, there is a need for government
intervention to compensate for these failures and to ensure equality of
opportunity for all students.
2. Modes of Government Intervention: Problems in
the Present System
As indicated earlier, there is a significant distinction between the pri-
vate and public university models in terms of the level of institutional
flexibility and overall resource support enjoyed by each. However, even
within the public university model, there is considerable variation across
jurisdictions in the precise way in which funding is transferred to
institutions by the state (number of levels of government involved,
performance- or non-performance-based funding, tied or untied pro-
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gram funding, degree of tuition pricing flexibility). Of course, there is
also considerable variance across jurisdictions in the actual magnitude
of state support that is provided to public universities. Yet despite this
variance in the character and level of state support, the demands that
have been placed on the public university have forced re-examination
of the central tenets of government intervention in this area. In the
following discussion, we briefly highlight some of the defects in state
support in order to consider the desirability and design challenges of an
alternative model.
Increased Demandfor Higher Education
One of the most significant challenges facing the received system of
publicly delivered university education emanates from the growing
level of student interest in obtaining a university education. Over the
last two decades, there has been a steady increase in the demand for
university education, at both the undergraduate and graduate levels.
This trend reflects, of course, underlying population trends (i.e., the rise
in the number of children in the 'echo-boom' cohort), but also a secular
increase in the demand for higher education programs among the
cohort. Further fuelling the demand for higher education in developed
countries is the rapidly surging population of students from develop-
ing countries who are interested in securing a university education
abroad (particularly in OEeD countries). In tandem, these demands
have placed excessive strain on existing public systems, particularly
where enrolment increases require enhanced funding support from
sponsoring governments in order for universities to expand programs
and facilities.
To the extent that governments have not been able to support pro-
gram expansion through enhanced public funding, universities have
reacted in a number of different ways. Some have simply refused to
increase their enrolment base, which means that otherwise qualified
students may be deprived of the benefits of higher education. Alterna-
tively, public universities may agree to enroll additional students (as a
result of pressure from sponsoring governments), but their decision to
do so has come at the cost of reduced program quality, as universities
have increased student-faculty ratios or reduced program offerings.
Other universities have sought to accommodate enrollment increases
by enlisting additional external financial support for the university
from private benefaction, industry, or private foundations. In some
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cases, public institutions have sought and obtained increased govern-
mental support for tuition increases, but typically these are still se-
verely constrained, and often seek to differentiate funding support on
the basis of student residency (in or out of state) or the character of
program study. In the former case, the striking disparities in the level of
fees charged by institutions depending on the jurisdiction of the partici-
pating student may raise vexing distributional questions when, for
instance, the least advantaged students from developing countries are
required to pay a substantial tuition premium relative to much more
privileged domestic students in developed countries. A further prob-
lem with differential student fees relates to the discriminatory impact
that this fee structure has on freedom of movement within nations
when deployed by lower-level governments.
Regressive Subsidization
Another challenge facing the current system of publicly funded univer-
sities relates to the highly regressive character of the funding formulas
typically used to allocate funds to recipient universities. Because public
universities are typically funded out of consolidated revenues (on a per
student basis), and because children of higher socio-economic groups
participate disproportionately in higher education, the system of flat
based funding constitutes a regressive transfer from poorer to more
affluent families.14 This pattern of public support that perpetuates,
rather than attenuates, intergenerational advantages has long been the
subject of criticism by commentators from several different political
perspectives. Because of this regressive transfer, Nicholas Barr, among
others, is highly critical of using general tax revenues to finance higher
education. 'The taxes of poor families contribute to the consumption by
the rich of a university education which helps to keep them rich.'1s
Chapman and Greenaway argue that 'not only is it the case that gradu-
ates receive high returns on average to investment in university there is
also no doubt that university students are more likely to come from
more privileged backgrounds.'16 The authors argue that the combina-
tion of these factors makes a system that does not charge (or minimally
charges) students for their post-secondary educations 'unquestionably
regressive.'17 That is, taxpayers, who do not receive as many benefits
from post-secondary education as graduates, are required to finance the
majority of others' educations.
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Quality
Quite apart from the distributional concerns that are associated with
existing systems of public delivery of university education, another set
of challenges relates to the quality of programs that public universities
can offer, particularly in relation to elite private institutions. At one
level, the problem is one of the overall level of resources. Overall
expenditure levels at elite private institutions are significantly higher
than comparable levels at public universities, particularly when ex-
pressed on a per student basis. This funding advantage reflects the
much greater regulatory latitude enjoyed by private institutions in
securing tuition fees from students, which are typically only constrained
by the market. This tuition revenue advantage is further buttressed by
the large accumulated endowments (which generate significant income)
and discretionary public research subsidies received by many elite
private institutions. In conjunction, the higher levels of revenue enjoyed
by elite private institutions confer a significant advantage on these
institutions in recruiting and retaining outstanding faculty in an in-
creasingly competitive international labour market, in mounting inno-
vative teaching programs, and in supporting complex and novel research
activities. IS The failure to allow public institutions to secure the funds
necessary to create outstanding programs is especially regrettable in
light of the large capital investments that states have previously made
in these institutions.
Inflexibility
At another level, however, the principal challenge for publicly funded
universities increasingly relates to the foregone efficiencies that could
be realized from less-stringent regulation of their conduct. Tuition price
caps and uniform public subsidies that do not differentiate on the basis
of institutional or program performance (or only crudely track it) limit
the incentive and the capacity of institutions to invest in the develop-
ment of innovative programs that are responsive to student prefer-
ences.l9 This lack of differentiation means that students are deprived of
the fullest possible range of programs in their home jurisdictions. It also
means that even if there is some realm for meaningful choice in select-
ing among different publicly funded programs, students will not have
access to important price information that, in conjunction with other
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forms of data, serves as a useful guide to institutional quality. In con-
junction, the demand and supply side distortions introduced by tuition
restrictions and non-differentiated state funding formulas are likely to
result in significant efficiency losses.
Attrition
A final challenge confronting publicly funded universities relates to the
lower levels of student program completion relative to private insti-
tutions. The seminal study is by Friedman and Friedman, which com-
pared student attrition rates at representative public and private
institutions in the United States, and found that whereas the attrition
rate at UCLA (publicly funded) was 50%, it was only 5% at Dartmouth
(privately funded).2o Canadian evidence supports the linkage of lower
tuition fees with higher dropout rates.21 The Smith Commission found
that 42% of students entering Canadian universities in 1985 failed to
obtain a degree within five years, and that the attrition rate in graduate
programs was lower, but still highly significant, at about one-third.22
The Smith Commission concluded that such statistics are'a symptom of
inadequate quality in the organization and delivery of [post-secondary]
education.'23 Another explanation may be that tuition fees at publicly
subsidized institutions historically have been so low that they do not
impress adequately on students the seriousness of the forgone benefits
associated with the non-completion of their post-secondary education
and the magnitude of the opportunity costs of forgoing workforce
participation for several years.
3. Post-secondary Education in Ontario
All provincial governments in Canada, including Ontario's, are exten-
sively involved in the provision and financing of post-secondary educa-
tion. Post-secondary education provides a variety of social benefits
such as equality of opportunity for economic success, increased infor-
mation and analysis of political decisions, and increased economic
growth through innovation and research. It also provides significant
private benefits to individuals, not the least of which is higher incomes,
particularly in the case of professional degrees. The mix of public and
private benefits points to a mixed role for governments and markets.
Post-secondary education (in universities and colleges) in Ontario is
primarily publicly funded. Canadian investment in post-secondary edu-
Towards a New Compact in University Education in Ontario 97
cation presents a mixed picture. Canadian expenditure per student is
the second highest, after the United States, among the G-7 countries,
and is substantially above the Australian and OECD average. As a
proportion of Gross Domestic Product, Canada places second behind
the US in the OECD, at 2.5% as compared to 2.7%.24 However, the
composition of the expenditure in the US and Canada differs markedly,
with Canada spending a much lower fraction of GDP on university
education and a much larger proportion On non-university post-
secondary education.24 At the community-college level, Canada's expen-
diture per student exceeds that of the US and all other G-7 countries.
Within Canada, the fraction of provincial GDP devoted to post-
secondary education in Ontario is lower than in all other provinces, and
substantially below the national average.26 Further, spending by the
Ontario government on university operating grants fell dramatically
between 1988 and 2001, as a percentage of the provincial budget (a 33%
decrease).27 This decline is in sharp contrast to spending On health,
which has risen over the period from approximately 32% of the provin-
cial budget in 1986/7 to 39% by 2001/2.28 Spending priorities have
obviously shifted from education to health care over this period. This
shift in spending has obvious implications for inter-generational equity
(the lion's share of health care funding is received by older citizens), as
well as long-term productive capacity of society.
Strikingly, Ontario has been at the bottom of all provinces in terms of
spending on universities per capita for the last eight years - per capita
spending on post-secondary education in 2003, adjusted for inflation,
was 20 per cent below its 19891eveI,29 In spending on universities per
student, Ontario has been tenth and last of all provinces for the past
three years and ninth for the five years before that,3D By 2003, Ontario
was last among all provinces in university spending per student, per
capita, or by any other measure.31 Tuition, on the other hand, rose over
the period from $2,200 to $4,700, an increase of 117%, before being
capped by the provincial government.32 Ontario student fees account
for an increasingly high percentage of university operating revenues,
and are the second highest in the country behind Nova Scotia's, and are
reflected in sharply rising student debt loads.33 However, Ontario uni-
versity tuition is comparable to Australian fees and significantly lower
than those of public universities in the United States.34 Interestingly,
Ontario college fees are among the lowest in Canada.35
While Ontario's funding of post-secondary education has declined
relative to other provinces, its position in relation to public universities
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in many American states is even more unsettling. Provincial funding
per full-time student in Ontario is now only half of per-student funding
of public institutions in California and North Carolina, and 60% of that
in Florida and Michigan. Compared to 12 American peer states, includ-
ing eight in the Great Lakes Region, the provincial government pro-
vides only two-thirds of the funding that state governments provide to
their public institutions. Between 1995/6 and 2000/1, Illinois, Michi-
gan, Indiana, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wiscon-
sin increased their state funding by between 20% and 35% while
Ontario's spending actually diminished by about 3%. [Ed: But see
Rosenstone, pp. 57-59, for another perspective.] As well, the federal
government provides grant funding that amounts, on a per~sh.ident
basis, to less than half of the funding provided by the US government to
its public institutions. This gap was not closed by increased Canadian
tuition revenues. In 2001, on average, Ontario's universities charged
only 82% of what their public American peer group charged, further
exacerbating the revenue differential. The gap in funding raises the
danger of an excellence and accessibility gap.
Has the funding in Ontario translated into accessible, high-quality
education and innovative research? For the country as a whole, 54%
of the Canadian adult population has completed some form of post-
secondary education. This proportion is double the OECD average of
26% and higher than that in the US, where 37% of the population has
completed post-secondary education.36 Canada has a much higher per-
centage of students who complete college, as opposed to university,
programs than either the US or other OECD countries. In terms of
students who complete university, Canada is above the OECD average
(20% versus the OECD average of 15%) and similar to Japan and
Britain, though substantially below the US, where 28% have graduated
from university, and further below the US in terms of percentage of
students who complete post-graduate degrees. However, 34% of Cana-
dians have non-university post-secondary education, triple the OECD
average and more than twice that of any G-7 country.37 In 2001, Ontario
had the highest proportion of its population with a university degree of
all provinces (24% versus the national average of 21%) and was slightly
below the national average of 34% in terms of individuals with a non-
university post-secondary education.38
However, the reduced public funding and rising tuition levels in
Ontario are raising concerns about accessibility to post-secondary edu-
cation in the province and, in particular, to university education. Even
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before the decline in funding in the 1990s, there was a growing dispar-
ity in university education between rich and poor. Between 1986 and
1994, participation in university education increased for 18-to-24-year-
olds of all socio-economic backgrounds. However, participation was
lowest and increased least for those from the lowest socio-economic
families. Individuals from middle socio-economic families participated
at a higher rate than those from lower socio-economic families, and
their rate increased the most prior to 1994. Individuals from the highest
socio-economic status had the highest level of participation in univer-
sity education over the period. These relative rates of participation
continued in the latter part of the 1990s, yet the pattern of change was
different. Individuals from middle- and high-income families were still
more likely to go to university than individuals from low-income fami-
lies, but their participation rates declined between 1994 and 1997. The
participation rate for individuals from low-income families, on the
other hand, increased over this period.39 Looking at post-secondary
education as a whole, students from lower-income families had about
the same rate of college participation as students from higher socio-
economic families. College, therefore, plays a greater role than universi-
ties in aiding these individuals.4o
The restraints on increased funding also raise concerns that the qual-
ity of Ontario's post-secondary education is not being maintained. The
student-faculty ratio provides one measure of the quality of post-sec-
ondary education in terms of teaching. This ratio in Ontario universities
is dramatically above the average for the other nine provinces, and
international comparisons are equally disma1.41 Further, in the coming
decade, Ontario will need to hire 11,700 faculty to deal with predicted
retirements and emolment increases and to keep student-faculty ratios
from deteriorating further.42
However, there is intense competition internationally for the best
academics. While there may not be an overall brain drain from Canada
to the US, certain groups are leaving the country at a disproportionate
rate, including university professors, engineers, and scientists. Ontario
universities require the funding to attract and retain outstanding re-
searchers and teachers.43
The reduced funding raises concern not only about the loss of faculty
but also about the deterioration of facilities. Ontario universities are
facing a very high level of deferred maintenance costs over the coming
years. While Ontario has invested in some capital funding in recent
years, the existing university facilities are aging, in need of repair, and
100 Taking Public Universities Seriously
badly lacking in space for faculty and students. The Council of Ontario
Universities estimated that in 2002 deferred maintenance amounted to
$1.3 billion or $1.56 billion when adaptation and renewal renovations
are included. Over $100 million per year is required merely to maintain
the status quO.44
One question that arises is whether Ontario (and Canada as a whole)
is misallocating resources by spending so much on non-university post-
secondary programs and having such a large number of graduates from
those institutions. Some commentators argue thatthis reflects a lack of
ambition on the part of Ontarians that needs to be remedied in order for
the province to prosper.45 An alternative explanation is that the funding
of non-university programs reflects demand in the labour market and
allows diversity of learning.
The economic effect in terms of private returns to the individual is
substantial for all types of education. University programs, and in
particular post-graduate degrees such as those in medicine and veteri-
nary medicine and PhDs, have the largest impact on individual earn-
ings. College programs and trade schools have a lower impact than
universities on the earnings of those who complete high school, al-
though they substantially increase the incomes of those who did not
finish high school. In both cases, the impact of post-secondary educa-
tion on earnings is greater for women than for men. As well, the in-
creased returns have been found to arise because education makes
individuals more productive (not because they merely signal existing
differences in people). These results suggest that universities do playa
central role in economic returns for Ontarians and provide a larger
return to the individual than a non-university post-secondary program.
However, colleges and trade schools also playa pivotal role in increas-
ing the economic opportunities of and returns to Ontarians, including
those who dropped out of high school.46
Top Canadian universities perform reasonably well with respect to
the volume of scholarly publications they produce, but lag substantially
behind the top US universities in terms of the recognition that their
research garners from scholars. It is fair to say that the quantity of
research emerging from Canadian universities is comparable, propor-
tionately, to the quantity produced by US universities, but that the
quality of research in Canada, which is what really matters, falls sub-
stantially behind the output found in top US institutions.47 This gap can
be attributed to proportionately lower levels of provincial financial
support for Canadian universities than is provided by US states to their
Towards a New Compact in University Education in Ontario 101
public institutions, to proportionately lower levels of federal research
funding in Canada, to poor allocation of research funding, and to sys-
tematically lower salary levels in Canada that hinder the ability of
Canadian universities to hire and retain the best and the brightest.
The policy environment for post-secondary education in Ontario
over the past two decades has been highly unstable. Apart from de-
clining levels of public funding, the system has endured the salary roll-
backs associated with the Rae government's Social Contract, the
draconian budget cuts associated with the Harris government's Com-
mon Sense Revolution, the subsequent partial liberalization of tuition
pricing policy, and then recently the McGuinty government's complete
freeze on tuition increases. These policy discontinuities have severely
compromised the ability of universities to engage in serious forward-
planning, including the ability to make salary commitments to hire and
retain faculty and invest in infrastructure. A new and more stable
compact between government and the post-secondary sector is sorely
needed.
4. Towards a New Compact for University Education in Ontario
The economic, social, and political benefits of post-secondary education
point to the need to foster a strong, broad-based educational system.
There are a number of reforms that should be made to improve the
post-secondary education system in Ontario. For example, the govern-
ment should improve the information available to students on employ-
ment and earnings associated with different programs so that students
can make better decisions about which programs to pursue. It should
also require post-secondary institutions to provide more informative
grading to aid both employers and students in making employment
and other decisions. Further, the government should improve accessi-
bilityand opportunities for students by expanding co-op programs and
improving the integration of colleges and universities.48
However, the greatest challenges facing post-secondary education in
Ontario relate to the funding of institutions, the quality of teaching and
research, and the accessibility of post-secondary education. The gov-
ernment can have the greatest impact on the financing, quality, and
accessibility of post-secondary education by reforming its funding and
tuition policies to promote excellence and diversity among programs.
Not all institutions or programs should be exactly the same and, as
Cameron notes, 'there is much to be said for increased diversity [in
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research intensity].'49 The current system aiming for similar programs
at all universities hobbles our universities' health as engines of innova-
tion, creativity and enlightenment. Promoting institutions and programs
with a variety of goals can aid in tailoring the post-secondary education
system to the needs of Ontarians. Some institutions should focus on
teaching, some on research, some on a combination of the two, and
some on vocational training. Moreover, there should be incentives to
promote excellence in particular programs rather than forcing or en-
couraging all institutions to deliver similar programs. Finally, because
education holds the key to equal economic and social opportuni-
ties, any reforms must ensure that individuals are not hindered from
obtaining post-secondary education because of their socio-economic
background.
Specifically, the province should undertake a four-part plan to pro-
mote diversity, quality, and accessibility in post-secondary education.
First, the amount of public money that is spent on post-secondary
education should be substantially increased so that on a public expen-
diture per student basis Ontario is the leading province not the last
province. Second, the amount of increased public funding for each
program should be tied to performance - that is, programs that provide
better quality should receive additional money. Third, tuition policy
should be deregulated to permit different fees for programs of different
quality, subject to the maintenance of effective financial aid programs
and policies administered by universities. Fourth, in order to ensure
that the cornerstone of a society in which each citizen is able to realize
his or her full potential - accessibility - is maintained, the province
should institute an income-contingent loan program and target an en-
hanced grant and loan program at increasing participation of individu-
als from lower income backgrounds in post-secondary learning,
particularly university education.
Public Money and Performance Funding
Ontario invests substantial funds in post-secondary education. This
money should be leveraged to ensure it is used to promote excellence in
teaching and research and a diversity of programs that will benefit
Ontarians. This leveraging can occur through performance funding.50
In Ontario, performance-based funding currently plays a very lim-
ited role. For 2000-1, the Ministry of Training, Colleges and Universities
distributed $16.5 million (relative to grants to universities of approxi-
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mately $1.7 billion)51 on the basis of three performance-based mea-
sures: graduation rates, graduate employment after six months, and
graduate employment after two years. Alberta and other U.s. states
have also used crude indicators, such as graduation rates and employ-
ment rates, in implementing similar performance-based funding
schemes.52 These indicators do not assess the quality of the research
taking place at an institution, nor do they adequately reflect the quality
of its graduates or the jobs they take. This performance funding repre-
sents only a modest beginning, comprising less than 1% of the $1.7
billion distributed to Ontario universities in the form of operating grants.
The majority of the Ontario government's funding for the university
system has been based on a flawed funding mechanism. Since the
1960s, funding has been based on a weighted average of the number of
students in various programs. The weights are determined by the rela-
tive cost of educating students in various programs.53 Provincial fund-
ing for the post-secondary sector is distributed essentially on the basis
of student enrolment, or full-time equivalent (FTE) enrolment, with
program weights then applied to enrolment numbers to yield Basic
Income Units (BIUs).54 Enrolment numbers therefore drive university
funding in Ontario without reference to quality - the strongest and the
weakest programs get largely the same financing. A key concern with
this funding mechanism is that it does not adequately take into account
both teaching and research. The government does increase the BIU
weight for students in more research-intensive graduate programs.
However, within each type of program, the funding mechanism does
not account for differences in the quantity or quality of research and
therefore for the costs of a greater volume of research or higher-quality
research.55 To be sure, in recent years both the federal and provincial
governments have launched a number of initiatives to enhance
research-based funding for Ontario universities.56 The federal govern-
ment, in particular, has taken significant steps to bolster leading
research, such as establishing Canada Research Chairs to fund
outstanding scholars.57
Still, the provincial funding mechanism does not distinguish between
high- and low-quality educational programs. Ontario universities are
relatively homogeneous in large part because the formula provides the
same funding for all programs and does not allow differences in tuition
fees to reflect variances in quality - with the recent exception of profes-
sional programs. Ontario institutions and programs vary less in terms
of quality and specialization than do institutions and programs in many
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US states or in Britain. At the present time, Ontario lacks research-
intensive universities with the reputation of top US state-funded uni-
versities, such as the University of California, Berkeley, or the University
of Michigan.58
We recognize the challenges in designing appropriate pedormance-
based funding systems as pointed out in several papers in this volume-
performance criteria that key on academic inputs, not outputs, or pref-
erably outcomes (which are admittedly difficult to measure or evaluate
directly), and perverse incentives or gaming behaviour that inappropri-
ate performance proxies can engender. However, asking governments
simply to write larger blank cheques on an across-the-board basis to the
post-secondary sector is politically untenable. In a setting of intense
fiscal pressure, governments must, by necessity, demonstrate that any
new public investment, is strategic, and can yield demonstrable im-
provements to the quality of publicly supported services. Therefore, to
respond to the need for differentiated performance-based investment,
but without an administratively cumbersome bureaucratic structure
that will subvert sound academic planning and performance, we rec-
ommend, in skeletal form, a four-tiered performance-based system that
would be structured as follows.
At the undergraduate level, additional public funding should be
made available for programs and institutions prepared to commit over
time to restoring tenure-stream faculty-student ratios to their 1990 level
(e.g., 17 to 1, not 27 to 1), given evidence that class size seems to be
highly correlated with the student undergraduate academic experience.
This funding should be significantly weighted by quality of the student
entering cohort to provide incentives for independent program im-
provement. At the post-graduate level, additional multi-year public
funding should be made available to create and reinforce a very small
number of internationally competitive post-graduate programs in most
of the major disciplines to enable the hiring and retention of interna-
tionally recognized faculty, to attract and support top graduate stu-
dents domestically and internationally, and to finance necessary
enhancements in physical infrastructure. This funding would be allo-
cated by a specialized provincial granting agency (like the federal grant-
ing agencies) in peer-reviewed competitions with well-defined
evaluating criteria and subject to periodic ex post peer review. Third,
project-specific research support would continue to be allocated by the
federal granting agencies in peer-reviewed periodic competitions. Fourth,
public support for infrastructure enhancements might primarily take
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the form of matching grants for donor-supported projects to enhance
incentives for universities to place a high premium on alumni satisfac-
tion and to cultivate and exploit their alumni and donor networks.
If performance-based funding were awarded to individual programs
instead of to entire institutions, top programs could be produced across
the province, although some institutions may always have a concentra-
tion of excellent programs. Universities that cannot compete against a
large institution like the University of Toronto would not be left out
because they could focus their resources on those areas in which they
have a comparative advantage. Indeed, Ontario's universities would be
encouraged to identify their strengths and improve programs that they
know are competitive provincially, nationally, or internationally.
In other words, most universities, rather than pursuing many medio-
cre programs, would have incentives to create a few internationally
recognized, excellent ones (somewhat analogous to, but more ambi-
tious than, the 'Centres of Excellence' that the province has promoted in
the recent past). This specialization introduces competition among uni-
versities for enhanced funding and, perhaps most importantly, im-
proves the overall efficacy of Ontario's university system by eliminating
wasteful duplication and making strong programs even stronger. As a
province, Ontario will have better programs and scholarship. Talent can
be attracted from other provinces and countries, and the education of
top graduate and professional students can be enriched. However, an
important feature of this funding regime is that no institution actually
loses financing that it is currently receiving - that is, no university is
punished or deprived of funding for failing to meet certain standards.
Enhanced funding is used to reward excellence and to create incentives
to excel in the future.
It is important to recognize that colleges are also a key component of
the post-secondary education system in the province. They provide a
wide range of students with the skills to compete for rewarding work.
They also playa particularly important role in providing education to
students from lower socio-economic backgrounds, as well as to those
who have dropped out of high school. The importance of colleges raises
the need for Ontario to provide sufficient public funding, yet there is
insufficient evidence to determine whether the financing of colleges
versus universities is out of balance. There are steps the province can
take to improve access to and choice in college education. First, Ontario
should enter into a Labour Market Development Agreement with the
federal government, enabling the province to better aid in tailoring
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college programs to the needs of Ontarians.59 Second, as with universi-
ties, additional funding for colleges should be performance-based to
develop and reward excellence in college programs. Third, the province
should take an active role in ensuring the provision of information to
students, such as the employment and income profiles of graduates
from each university and college program, to enable them to make
informed choices. Finally, the province should take steps to promote the
integration of colleges and universities to provide greater access to
post-secondary education, especially in areas where there are no uni-
versities, and greater movement between post-secondary programs as
students assess their abilities and interests.6D To date, there has been
only limited collaboration between universities and colleges.
Tuition, Choice, and Accessibility
Government funding of post-secondary education reflects the social
benefits derived from a strong post-secondary system, as well as the
information and funding problems facing students. The reality is that
under any scenario there are insufficient public funds to close the
excellence gap between Ontario universities and top international
public institutions. As noted, post-secondary education produces sub-
stantial private returns. Full government funding of post-secondary
education results in all Ontarians bearing the costs of educating indi-
viduals who stand to obtain very large personal returns. Because such
subsidies are financed through taxes, they either reduce the amount of
public money available to finance other programs, or they necessitate
higher taxes. As a result of this mix of the private and social effects of
education, both the provincial government and the individuals who
stand to gain should invest in post-secondary education. In 2001, stu-
dent fees accounted for 26.3% of Ontario universities' revenue, among
the highest in Canada. Government funds accounted for 47.8% of rev-
enues, the lowest share in Canada.6l
When individuals must pay part of the cost of their education, they
will be more selective about their programs, and thus institutions would
have greater incentives to pay attention to students' interests. These
incentives would be even sharper if programs were able to set different
fees. Programs of higher quality could charge higher tuition, although
they would have to demonstrate the justification for the higher cost to
students.
However, tuition payments by individuals raise concern about a key
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tenet of the education system in Ontario - accessibility. Education should
be equally available to all qualified individuals, regardless of their
family or personal background - that is, their socio-economic status.
While individuals tend to obtain higher incomes as a result of post-
secondary education, financial institutions are in general reticent to
lend money for this type of investment in human capital because hu-
man capital cannot be collateralized like other assets. As a result, with-
out specific arrangements to promote accessibility, raising tuition fees
will reduce the opportunity of less well-off individuals to benefit from a
post-secondary education. Further, even where funds are available to
aid such students, they may hesitate to apply to universities because of
the 'sticker shock' from the high tuition levels.
Rising tuition fees in Canada have increased the debt level of stu-
dents. For example, by 1995,46% of bachelor's graduates borrowed for
their education, with the mean amounts of the loans rising sharply from
around $6,000 in 1982 to $13,600 in 1995.62 The average government-
student-loan debt of students who went to university for four years and
finished their program in 2002 was $21,500.63 The federal and provin-
cial governments help with loans through the Canada Student Loan
Program and the Ontario Student Assistance Program. These loans are
similar to mortgages in that they must be repaid following graduation,
with interest. As well, students' access to loans is limited because not
everyone qualifies for them, as they are means-tested on the basis of
family income. Such means testing presumes unencumbered access of
individuals to family resources. Howevel~ those in charge of the distri-
bution of household finances to household members may not have the
prospective student's view of the value of education.64 In addition, a
large number of students default on their loans,65 partly because there
are no serious disincentives to prevent them from doing SO.66 The high
costs of these defaults are absorbed by the government. For example,
the cost to the federal government of collecting at-risk student loans is
estimated at between 19 and 28 cents per dollar.67 Furthermore, since
the government guarantees the loan to the university or college by
paying the student's fees up front, universities and colleges put too
little effort into debt recovery or into screening students adequately to
determine their prospects for successful completion of programs. There
is a wide variation of institutional performance on repayment.
More importantly, under the current system, some students may be
reluctant to borrow out of fear of not meeting future repayment obli-
gations. This concern arises because these loans for education are in-
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sensitive to the borrower's changing financial circumstances. These
prospective students will not borrow and therefore will not attend
university or college.68 The fear of not being able to pay back the loan
will likely have a disproportionate effect on the disadvantaged. This
impact of the current loan programs therefore has important conse-
quences for the accessibility of post-secondary education.
A better approach to student financing involves income-contingent
loans (ICLs). An ICL involves students contracting with the govern-
ment to repay deferred fees in proportion to their future income. Stu-
dents pay up front only as much as they can, with the rest deferred until
they graduate and are working. The government supplies the univer-
sity or college with the fees that students have deferred. Students
eventually repay their deferred fees through the income-tax system, in
proportion to their earnings. The introduction of such regimes in other
countries is often accompanied by deregulated tuition fees and direct
subsidies for low-income students.
The main attraction of ICLs is that they can be designed to avoid the
problems associated with Ontario's current system of traditional loans.
First, there is no concern with intra-family sharing so long as the scheme
is universal. No students would be denied access through the imposi-
tion of means-testing arrangements that could exclude some whose
parents or partners are unwilling to help.69 Second, the default issue for
the government is largely addressed by deploying the tax system to
collect the debt, since it is extremely difficult for the vast majority of
graduates to avoid repayment.7°
Some students will not pay back their deferred fees in full because
ICLs are designed to forgive the fees of students whose lifetime in-
comes are below a certain threshold. Those students may be able to pay
back a portion of their fees, which is an improvement over the complete
defaults occurring under the current system. Students who earn in-
comes below a certain threshold will not have to make any contribution
through the tax system in that year, though they will when their career
prospects improve. In other words, ICLs mitigate the risks that students
face when they invest in higher education.
Since 1989, Australia, New Zealand, and Britain have introduced
ICLs for post-secondary education. These countries had in the past
offered essentially free post-secondary education. The Australia and
New Zealand systems have loan repayments dependent on an
individual's income and reduce the costs of the program by having the
payments collected through the tax system. In each case, there is a
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minimum threshold below which the loan does not have to be repaid,
with a progressive rate of collection, depending on the individual's in-
come. In both cases, institutions are now permitted to set their own fees.
In Australia, accessibility appears to have been maintained. The socio-
economic make-up of the higher education student body was about the
same in the late 1990s as it was before these loans were introduced.71
This can be explained by a number of factors. First, ICLs will not deter
students in the same way that up-front loans can - by shocking lower-
income students with immediate, large debt. As well, post-secondary
enrolments in Australia have increased by some 50% as a result of the
increases in tuition and increased post-secondary spending by the Aus-
tralian government. Finally, the recent reforms of 2003 emphasize the
importance of improving the performance of indigenous peoples and
disadvantaged minorities through scholarships and other equity-based
measures.
Overall, income-contingent loans appear to have been a successful
innovation in post-secondary funding in Australia and New Zealand.
Their use of the national income-taxation infrastructure stands out as a
crucial feature of a well-designed ICL program.72 Britain is moving in a
similar direction after introducing a limited form of ICL in 1997. A
review of higher education in 2003 is pointing towards an expanded
ICL program with universities setting their own tuition levels, subject
to a cap, and students making ICL repayments after graduation through
the income tax system.
The Australian, New Zealand and u.K. reforms provide a clear direc-
tion for Ontario.73 No students, regardless of family income, should be
required to pay tuition up front, although they may if they choose.
Loans for post-secondary education should be repayable after gradua-
tion on an income-contingent basis, that is, they should depend on a
student's future income, and the most efficient mechanism by which
they can be collected is through the income tax system. With such
arrangements in place, the regulation of tuition fees can be substantially
loosened, permitting universities and colleges to more effectively supple-
ment their public subsidy with contributions from students. Since these
contributions are income-contingent, they will be made in proportion to
the earnings advantage that individual students enjoy as a result of
their education.
An ICL program would address the risk inherent in human capital
investments, because those whose post-graduation earnings are below
average are not faced with high debt loads, as would be the case under
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a conventional student loan program. Those whose earnings are below
average may repay less under lCLs, but those who achieve above-
average earnings will likely repay more than under the current sys-
tem.74 Other advantages of lCLs include a scheduling of payments that
is more closely aligned with the evolution of the individual's ability to
pay, reduced administrative costs, and lower default rates.
Further, when a student defers his or her tuition fees, the province
should supply the university or college with the deferred amount.
These payments will enable post-secondary institutions to operate free
of uncertainty with respect to yearly tuition revenues. Once the student
has graduated and is working to payoff the lCL, the provincial govern-
ment will assess contributions to be paid through the income tax sys-
tem, thereby recouping its original loan. In order to enhance institutional
incentives to screen students for prospects of successful program comple-
tion, the college or university should bear some part of the risk of
default, such as through reduced public funding based on default rates.
In order to maximize the benefits of diversity of institutions and
increase choice in post-secondary education in Ontario, when the prov-
ince has introduced an lCL program it should deregulate tuition fees.
Deregulating tuition fees would encourage universities and colleges to
expand enrolment to meet the demand for their programs and enable
outstanding programs to differentiate themselves and aspire to even
higher levels of international excellence. It would also provide colleges
and universities with funding they need because of the recent reduc-
tions in public funding. This added funding would aid in improving
the quality of higher education in Ontario.
Deregulating tuition, even with lCLs, raises concerns about partici-
pation by individuals from poorer socio-economic backgrounds. If
education is to have the benefits it potentially could have in terms of
reducing inequality and opening up opportunities for the less well-off,
higher education needs to be a viable option for all Ontarians. The
province, therefore, should supplement an lCL program with a grant
program to increase the participation in post-secondary education and,
in particular, university education by individuals from less-privileged
socio-economic groups. The federal government has taken some steps
in this regard through the Millennium Scholarships Program, as has
Ontario through the Ontario Student Opportunities Trust Fund.75 These
programs have led to an increase in participation by lower-income
individuals in the latter part of the 1990s.76 However, more needs to be
done to increase the participation rate of these individuals. The prov-
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ince should increase the funding of grants and monitor this participa-
tion rate with a view to increasing it significantly over time, perhaps
towards a specific targeted level.
Deregulating tuition, combined with ICLs and increased grants, would
allow institutions to differentiate themselves and to foster outstanding
programs. However, the province should not attempt to micromanage
post-secondary admissions and program offerings.77 Evidence from
Britain indicates that micromanagement by the state decreases univer-
sity independence and results in lower standards.78 Institutions should
make the decisions about which programs to develop and how to meet
the needs of students. Unlike the province, these institutions have the
information to make the creative and innovative decisions necessary to
foster excellence. The public interest in post-secondary education in a
system centred around institutional diversity can be protected in two
ways. First, as noted above, there will continue to be public funding of
universities, which will allow the province to maintain incentives for
institutions to pursue the public interest. Second, a diverse, and vocal,
set of stakeholders, including the public, have input into the decisions
of post-secondary institutions through the governance regimes of indi-
vidual universities and colleges. There has been no scarcity of scrutiny
and debate in these fora in the past over the ways in which excellence
and accessibility can be promoted and it is unlikely that there will be a
shortage in the future. This form of civic engagement in the decisions of
institutions helps allay concerns that they will use public funding or
increased tuition revenue in ways that do not promote the public inter-
est. To aid both these avenues of monitoring, the province should
require every university and college governing council to demonstrate
that they have a credible access program in place. Each governing
council should be required to make a public report to the government
every three years on the effectiveness of its access program. Such re-
porting would ensure that the province and the public have the infor-
mation necessary to assess progress on accessibility.
5. Conclusion
Ontario needs a new relationship between government and students to
ensure high-quality, accessible post-secondary education. To this end,
spending on post-secondary education in Ontario should be, on aver-
age, the highest in Canada on a per student basis. In order for Ontario to
achieve the highest levels of public support per student in Canada (not
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the lowest), the recent report of the Panel on the Role of Government in
Ontario79 roughly estimated, this would entail additional public expen-
ditures of $1.3 billon per year, phased in over several years. This num-
ber needs to be put in perspective. The total provincial expenditure
budget as of 2004 is about $80 billion. Of this, about $30 billion is spent
on health care and only $4 billion on post-secondary education. An
additional infusion of public funding of $1.3 billion, if appropriately
structured, along with a further infusion of revenues from deregulated
tuition fees, have the potential for a transformatory impact on the post-
secondary sector, promoting institutional specialization in internation-
ally competitive programs, enhancing the student learning experience
at both undergraduate and post-graduate levels, and enhancing stu-
dent accessibility to higher-quality programs through income-contin-
gent loans and grants to meritorious students from disadvantaged
backgrounds.
These reforms represent a new partnership between government and
students and will promote both excellence and accessibility in post-
secondary education in Ontario.
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